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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EVIDENCE - EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY
SEIZED BY STATE OFFICERS WITHOUT PARTICIPATION OF FEDERAL
OFFICERS HELD INADmISSIBLE IN FEDERAL CouRT.--Petitioners were
convicted in a federal district court for intercepting and divulging
telephonic communications. Before trial, their motion to suppress
evidence obtained by state officers in an allegedly illegal search and
seizure was denied. The court assumed that the search and seizure
was unreasonable, but stated that since there was no federal partici-
pation, the evidence was admissible in a federal court. The Supreme
Court, in reversing the conviction, held that evidence obtained by a
state officer during a search is inadmissible in a federal criminal trial
upon the defendant's timely objection, if the acts of the state officer
do not meet the standards of the fourth amendment. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that the people shall be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Although it establishes a constitutional prohibition, it
is silent as to the consequences of its violation. At common law an
unreasonable search and seizure was considered a trespass,' and as
a consequence, the victim had the remedies of resisting the search,
suing the searcher and securing restitution of the seized property."
Restitution, however, was not granted until the government no longer
needed the seized articles as evidence.3 Thus, at common law and
in the United States until 1886, the admissibility of evidence was not
affected by the illegal means by which it was obtained. The reason
was that the function of the court was to ascertain evidence, not to
enforce the law. Moreover, it is a basic rule of evidence that a court
will not inquire into matters such as the origin of the evidence be-
cause it would confuse the issues and constitute unfair surprise to
the proponent. 4
' See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886), referring to Entick
v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765); Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301 (1957), quoting William Pitt, "The poorest man may in
his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its
roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the
rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter-all his force dares
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenementl" Id. at 307.2 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 n.1 (1949) ; Grant, Circumventing
the Fourth Amendment, 14 So. CAL. L. REv. 359, 365 (1941).
3 See Grant, Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding the Use of
Illegally Seized Evidence, 15 So. CAL. L. REV. 60 (1941).
4 See 8 WIGmoRE, EViDENcE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940).
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However, the Supreme Court, in Boyd v. United States! re-
viewed a federal forfeiture proceeding in which the "defendant" 0
was ordered to produce certain documents as required by a fed-
eral statute. The Court declared that the compulsory produc-
tion of the documents compelled the "defendant" to be a witness
against himself within the meaning of the fifth amendment, and was
the equivalent of an illegal search and seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.7 The Court seemingly could have based its
decision solely on the fifth amendment; s nevertheless it joined the
fourth and fifth amendments in. a relationship in which each threw
light on the other.9 This decision, in which the Court gave both the
fourth and fifth amendments substantially the same meaning in regard
to the use in evidence of illegally seized property, 0 planted the first
seeds of the federal exclusionary rule.
In Adams v. New York," the Court reviewed a state case in
which the defendant had been convicted of a gambling violation.
Over his objection, evidence was introduced which had been seized
by state police. Adams contended that the receipt in evidence of the
papers seized violated the fourth and fifth amendments, and that these
amendments were applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.' 2 The Court refused to discuss whether the fourth and
fifth amendments were applicable to the states, but nevertheless stated
that the admissibility of the evidence was not a violation of the fourth
or fifth amendment, because a court will not take notice of how evi-
dence is obtained. 13  The narrow holding of the Adams case could
simply be that the search there involved was legal.14 The significance
of the case, however, lies in the Court's broad statements that the
prohibition of the fourth amendment should not be extended to effect
the exclusion of evidence obtained by such seizure.'5
The theme of the Boyd case, despite the hostile treatment ac-
corded it in Adams, enjoyed a partial renaissance in Weeks v.
5 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
6 Although the forfeiture proceeding was technically civil, the court stated
that it was criminal in substance and effect. Id. at 633-34.
7 Id. at 633.
8 Id. at 638 (concurring opinion).
9 Id. at 633.
:0 See Kohn, Admissibility in Federal Court of Evidence Illegally Seized
By State Officers, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 229, 231-32.
11192 U.S. 585 (1904).
12 Id. at 594.
13 Ibid.
14 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 395 (1914). But see Trimble,
Search and Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment as Interpreted By the
United States Supreme Court, 41 Ky. L.J. 196 (1952). The author in refer-
ring to the Adams opinion declares "its confusion almost defies analysis."
Id. at 202.
1. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904).
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United States.1 There, state police illegally seized a number of in-
criminating documents from Weeks' home. They returned the same
day, accompanied by a United States Marshal, who seized additional
incriminating evidence. The evidence obtained in both searches was
used to convict Weeks in a federal trial. Weeks' application before
trial for the return of this evidence was denied, and on appeal to the
Supreme Court he contended that the admission of this evidence was
in violation of the fourth and fifth amendments. The Court held that
evidence obtained by federal agents in violation of the fourth amend-
ment was inadmissible in a federal criminal prosecution.17 It reasoned
that if the evidence were admissible, then the fourth amendment was
"of no value, and, . . . might as well be stricken from the Consti-
tution." is In order to circumvent the broad statements in the
Adams case, the Court seized upon the fact that Weeks had made an
application for the return of the evidence prior to his trial.19 The
collateral issue of how the evidence was obtained should, therefore,
be determined prior to the trial, not during it, as was attempted in
Adams. Since the Court did not mention the fifth amendment, the
exclusion of the evidence seemed to stein directly from the violation
of the fourth amendment.20 Apparently the Court felt that a neces-
sary, though unexpressed, consequence of a violation of the fourth
amendment is exclusion of the illegally seized evidence.
Another rule, later to be characterized as the "silver platter"
doctrine,21 had its inception in the last few lines of the Weeks case,
when the Court further held that since the fourth amendment applied
only to the federal government and not to "individual misconduct," 22
the evidence illegally seized by state officers in the initial search was
admissible in a federal prosecution.23
In a series of Supreme Court cases the scope of the federal
exclusionary rule gradually expanded, at the expense of both the
"silver platter" doctrine and the procedural requirements of a pre-
liminary motion.2 4  Goided v. United States2 5 held that a motion
16232 U.S. 383 (1914).
17 Id. at 398.
Is Id. at 393.lId. at 395-96.2 0 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
21 This phrase describing the admissibility of evidence illegally seized by
state officers in federal courts was first used in Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74, 79 (1949).
22 Evidence seized by a private citizen in an unauthorized search is admissible.
See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
23 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
24 Rule 41 (E) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that an
"aggrieved party" may petition for the return and suppression of illegally
seized evidence. The petitioner must establish that he himself was a victim
of an invasion of privacy. Anyone legitimately on the premises where the
search occurs may challenge its legality by a motion to suppress the evidence
seized. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261-65 (1960).
25255 U.S. 298 (1921) ; accord, Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
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before trial was unnecessary if the defendant was unaware of the
illegal search. In Agnello v. United States,26 it was held that evi-
dence was inadmissible without a motion if the facts of the case
clearly showed an illegal search.2 7  Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States 28 held that knowledge obtained from illegally seized
documents could not be the basis for the issuance of a subpoena.
Byars v. United States 29 held that a search conducted jointly by
federal and state officers was a federal search, and the illegally seized
evidence was therefore inadmissible. The Court went even further
in Gambino v. United States,3 0 holding that evidence illegally seized
by state officers solely for the purpose of aiding federal prosecution
was also inadmissible. In Rea v. United States 31 the Court enjoined
a federal officer from introducing illegally acquired evidence in a state
court.
3 2
The foundation of the "silver platter" doctrine was undermined
in Wolf v. Colorado.3 3  Evidence illegally seized by a state officer
was used to convict Wolf in a state court. On certiorari, the Court
declared that the core of the fourth amendment was applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment, and that therefore the Con-
stitution, by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, prohibited unrea-
sonable searches and seizures by state officers.34 Before reaching the
ultimate conclusion that evidence illegally seized by the state was
admissible in a state prosecution,35 the Court had to overcome the
following difficulty: if the exclusionary rule was derived from the
fourth amendment itself, as Weeks had apparently stated, then this
rule, of necessity, was also applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. 36 The Court simply stated that the exclu-
sionary rule, rather than being a compulsion of the fourth amend-
ment, was merely "judicially implicated" 37 from it.3s
26269 U.S. 20 (1925).
27 See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926). Judge Cardozo
stated that the preliminary motion requirement had practically been abandoned.
Id. at 20-21, 150 N.E. at 587.
28251 U.S. 385 (1920).
29273 U.S. 28 (1927).
30275 U.S. 310 (1927).
31350 U.S. 214 (1956).
32 But see Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), where the Court re-
fused to enjoin the use in a state court of evidence illegally seized by a state
officer.
33 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
34 Id. at 27-28.3
r Id. at 33.36 See Galler, The Exclusion of Illegal State Evidence in Federal Courts,
49 J. CRin. L., C. & P.S. 455, 457 n.8 (1958).
37 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
38 The shifted basis of the exclusionary rule is vividly illustrated in Wolf.
where the majority states that the rule is "judicially implicated" from the
fourth amendment. The concurring opinion states that it is a rule of evidence,
[ VOL. 35
RECENT DECISIONS
In the present case the Court reasoned that if evidence seized
in violation of the fourth amendment was inadmissible in a federal
prosecution, then evidence seized in violation of the fourteenth
amendment should likewise be inadmissible 3 9 -otherwise the Court
would be giving undue preference to the fourth amendment.
40
Cognizant of the fact that the federal exclusionary rule had en-
gendered much criticism, 41 the Court fortified the logic of its decision
by reiterating that the rule is calculated "to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by re-
moving the incentive to disregard it." 42 It also found solace in the
fact that many states had adopted an exclusionary rule. 43 Yet the
holding indicates that state law is immaterial to the validity of the
search for the purpose of determining the admissibility of evidence
in a federal prosecution.44
The exclusionary rule seems to have reached its limit in the
present case, for it is unlikely that the Court will impose this rule
upon the states in the future.45 The rule in the federal courts,
however, is firmly embedded, and since scholarly criticism of the
rule in the past has been rejected by the Court, further criticism
seems futile. Congress may legislate the rule out of existence, as
the Court itself has suggested,4 6 but this is highly unlikely. Never-
theless, a case will inevitably arise to test the rule. If a basis for
the rule is the integrity of the Court, will that integrity withstand
and the dissent states that it is a part of the fourth amendment itself. Wolf
v. Colorado, supra note 37.
39 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 215 (1960). This remedied the
evil of the "silver platter" doctrine that permitted federal courts to flout state
policy by accepting illegally seized evidence in states that had adopted an
exclusionary rule. Id. at 221. It also remedied the defect that Cardozo pointed
out: federal officers were on one side of the law and state police on the
other. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 22-23, 15 N.E. 585, 588 (1926).40 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 215 (1960).
41 Id. at 208 n.2.
42 Id. at 217. But see Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 135 (1954),
where the Court stated that it is doubtful if the exclusionary rule deters
illegal searches and seizures.
43 Elkins v. United States, supra note 40, at 218-19. See the Court's survey
of individual states in appendix. Id. at 224.
44 Id. at 223-24. See Kohn, Admissibility in Federal Court of Evidence
Illegally Seized by State Officers, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 229, 240 n.76. It is
conceivable that there could be evidence gathered in a state search, legal by
the standards of the fourteenth amendment, which would be inadmissible in a
federal court because of illegality under the standards of the fourth amend-
ment. Ibid. See Grant, Circumventing the Fourth AmeOtdment, 14 So. CAL.
L. REv. 359, 368 n.43 (1941), criticizing this double standard.
45 See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132-34 (1954), where the Court
stated that it would not foist upon the states a vague rule about which the
Court itself cannot be consistent. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951),
stated that because of the delicate federal-state relationship, this rule should
not be applied to the states.
46 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
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the reaction to a case in which the Court cannot use a murdered
body 47 as evidence because a "constable has blundered"? 48
A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-DIsMISSAL OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR INSUBORDINATION IN REFUSING TO ANSWER
QUESTIONS OF INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE ON FIFTH AMENDMENT
GROUNDS HELD LAWFUL.-A California statute' provided that it
was the duty of any state employee subpoenaed before a state or
federal committee to answer any questions concerning membership in
certain organizations. Petitioners, subpoenaed before a congressional
investigative committee, were further ordered by their employer, the
County of Los Angeles, to answer any questions which might be
asked of them. Upon their refusal to do so on fifth amendment
grounds, they were discharged. The United States Supreme Court,
affirming the California Supreme Court, held that the dismissal was
lawful because the Court concluded that petitioners were dismissed
for insubordination in refusing to answer proper questions and not
because they invoked their constitutional privilege. Nelson v. County
of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
"This," as Mr. Justice Brennan sadly remarked, "is another in
the series of cases involving discharges of state and local employees
from their positions after they claim their constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination before investigating committees." 2 The
area has been marked by a series of close decisions and bitter dissents.
In Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,3 city employees were discharged
for their refusal to execute a loyalty affidavit. A declaratory judg-
ment in Adler v. Board of Educ.4 upheld a statute which provided
for the dismissal of state employees knowingly belonging to subversive
organizations as unfit. These earlier cases established the validity
of dismissals based on insubordination or subversive activities casting
doubt on the employee's fitness.5 They rested on the doctrine that
47 See Grant, Circionventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 So. CAL. L. REv.
359, 364-65 (1941).
48 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21. 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
1 CAL GOV'T CODE § 1028.1 (Deering 1958).2 Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 10 (1960) (dissenting
opinion).
3341 U.S. 716 (1951) (Frankfurter and Burton, JJ., dissenting in part
in separate opinions; Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting in separate opinions).4342 U.S. 485 (1952) (Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas, JJ., dissenting
in separate opinions).
5 Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Garner v. Board of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
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